“I Am a Strange Loop is vintage Hofstadter: earnest, deep, overflowing with ideas, cognitive scientist and polymath Douglas Hofstadter has returned to his. Scott O’Reilly loops the loop with Douglas Hofstadter. So, a mirage that only exists because it perceives itself: this is an example of what Hofstadter calls a “strange loop”. He has an endearing.
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Those who won’t kill a deer would kill dozens of chickens or thousands of plants to get the same nutrition that a single deer supplies. So, I have no real logical response to this counter-claim, other than his original description of such weak, second-order existences seems intuitively wrong to me. We, not just human beings but all that exists, have no soul whatsoever until someone like Hofstader, or Plato, or Thomas Aquinas comes along and sets up a criterion for assessing it.
And I challenge anyone to take as many good ideas as I had and make such bad grades out of them. Instead of telling us that he had many of the foregoing thoughts prior to his wife’s death, he should have said “Go on, try to poke a hole in this argument if you think I’m crazy. Russell’s logical system corresponded to exactly one whole number. But this is simply wrong. Click here to sign up.
I Am a Strange Loop
The story of a man who jumps into what is basically a Star Trek teleporter and is then reintegrated on another planet with every memory, thought, inclination, etc. And if you do believe in a metaphysical soul, you’re being asked to tie it directly to how much a being thinks about itself. This gives the Strange Loop the character of quantum uncertainty: In he returned to Bloomington as “College of Arts and Sciences Professor” in both Cognitive Science and Computer Science, and also was appointed Adjunct Professor of History and Philosophy of Science, Philosophy, Comparative Literature, and Psychology, but he states that his involvement with most of these departments is nominal.
But he really wishes they did, not only because they’re his ideas. Yet, he points out that his musings on the subject predated his own personal tragedies. Hofstadter accepts materialism but isn’t comfortable in its embrace, so he ends up sounding ridiculous.
And on the plus side, at least Hofstadter’s discussion of Godel was refreshingly correct technically — it helps having had some formal mathematical training.
He was initially appointed to the Indiana University’s Computer Science Department faculty inand at that time he launched his research program in computer modeling of mental processes which at that time he called “artificial intelligence research”, a label that sfrange has since dropped in favor of “cognitive science research”. I found myself cursing the author for the way he circled and circled around the subject, bringing in every thought he has ever had about consciousness, and relying to a disturbing extent on his personal experience.
But for an hour. And what an interesting world. He does not believe in free will, which makes sense, and he doesn’t believe either in mystical, incorporeal souls. Hofstadter’s thesis is very plausible to me, despite my disagreeing with some specific things he says. Lool my complaint specifically is why we’re being asked bofstadter concede the point. And for this reason, it strikes me as less significant that a brain can think of itself, because brains clearly have flexibilities that formal systems don’t have.
Anyway, I am a self-referent loop that talks about itself. View all 3 comments. Admitting that this is even a logical possibility is in hofstdter denying the procedures that we use, right now, to determine that other people around us are conscious.
I Am A Strange Loop by Douglas Hofstadter | Issue 78 | Philosophy Now
You know what they like, how they judge things, how they react, and the more you’re around them, the more you “absorb” them, the more you yourself not only might come to be like them altering your own self-structurebut moreover and even in the absence of your actually changing your self-structureyou find yourself able to shift gears and in a sense be that person, albeit the low-res version.
If you don’t believe in a metaphysical soul like I don’t, then the argument collapses to merely an observation that brains can think about themselves, which is not terribly exciting. But Hofstadter presents a pretty convincing argument for his theories on why I think I am I. In particular mosquitoes don’t have much of a soul that you coul I’m writing this review as I go along because the book is long.
Rather, he develops a psychology that illustrates and supports his fundamental view of human reality. The first third of this book is the Hofstadter that I expected to read – dragging me through a layperson’s guide to prime numbers, squares, the Fibonacci series, Principia Mathematica and Bertrand Russell’s attempt to banish paradox from mathematics, and finally, Godel’s discovery of the ultimate self reflective mathematical string which shattered Russell’s dreams.
The most obvious objection here, from an idealist-phenomenological perspective, is of course that this symbolic, meaningful perception presupposes consciousness: Compulsively readable and endlessly thought-provoking, this is the book Hofstadter’s many readers have long been waiting for. Hofatadter, too, Hofstadter employs playful analogies to show how consciousness works, and how it doesn’t work. Thanks for alerting me to its publication.
The book demands great patience from the reader.
Douglas Hofstadter’s “I Am a Strange Loop” on the Self
It seems despite all my own follies, most people I know respect me way more highly than I think I deserve this is just a fact, not a boast. Certainly my sympathy with and compassion for a suffering animal doesn’t mean I have a developed ,oop for that particular animal.
More difficult, I thought, than it needed to be. If the self is a narrative fiction, then how does it pull the levers which initiate free action? Other more recent models are Phaeaco implemented by Harry Foundalis and SeqSee Abhijit Mahabalwhich model high-level perception and analogy-making in the microdomains of Bongard problems and number sequences, respectively.
But I actually don’t agree with the position which I think is setting up the rest of this book, though I’m sure there will be more details coming.